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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3097 
___________ 
 
JAMES V. WALLACE, 
                               Appellant  
 
v. 
 
WARDEN DAVID EBBERT;  
KEVIN BITTENBENDER, D.H.O. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-01936) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 16, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 20, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant, James V. Wallace, is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se.  On August 
23, 2010, while he was an inmate at the Allenwood Federal Correctional Institution in 
White Dear, Pennsylvania, (“FCI-Allenwood”), he was issued an incident report for 
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violating the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Prohibited Acts Code 112, which 
prohibits the use of any narcotics not prescribed by medical staff.  See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, 
tbl. 1.  According to the incident report, Wallace’s August 17, 2010 urine sample had 
tested positive for opiates.  On September 3, 2010, at a hearing before a Disciplinary 
Hearing Officer (“DHO”), Wallace admitted the charge against him.  Based on Wallace’s 
admission and other evidence, the DHO sustained the disciplinary charge.  After noting 
that this was Wallace’s fourth Code 112 violation, and explaining the seriousness of the 
offense, the DHO sanctioned him as follows: (1) loss of eighteen months of telephone 
privileges, as well as three years of visiting privileges; (2) disciplinary segregation of 
sixty days; (3) disallowance of fifty-four days of good time credit; and (4) forfeiture of 
458 days of non-vested good time credit.            
 On October 19, 2011, Wallace filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 claiming that the DHO impermissibly relied on his prior Code 112 
violations to “enhance” the sanctions pertaining to his good time credits.  According to 
Wallace, the sanctions were “harsh and unjust,” and violated both 28 C.F.R. § 541.3 and 
BOP Program Statement 5270.09, which outlines the inmate discipline program in 
accordance with the underlying regulation.  The District Court denied the petition, and 
Wallace timely appealed.     
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(a).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and 
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review its factual findings for clear error.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 
(3d Cir. 2007).    
The District Court correctly concluded that Wallace’s punishment fell within the 
range of acceptable punishments outlined in the applicable regulations.
1
  Pursuant to 
Table 1 of 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, the DHO was permitted to “[f]orfeit and/or withhold . . . 
non-vested good conduct time (up to 100%),” and “[d]isallow ordinarily between 50% 
and 75% (27-41 days) of good conduct time credit available for a year.”  Wallace’s loss 
of 458 days of non-vested good conduct time was clearly permitted by this regulation, 
and, although the loss of 54 days of good conduct time exceeded the “ordinar[y]” 
sanction, nothing in Table 1 prohibited the DHO from disallowing a greater percentage of 
his good conduct time in an effort to deter him from future infractions—especially given 
his history of Code 112 violations.  Furthermore, while Wallace argues that the DHO was 
not permitted to enhance his punishment under Table 2 based on prior offenses that were 
more than two years old, see 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, tbl. 2 (“Additional Available Sanctions 
for Repeated Prohibited Acts Within the Same Severity Level”), the DHO did not rely on 
Table 2 to determine his punishment; rather, as previously noted, the DHO imposed 
sanctions permitted under Table 1.   
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
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 The District Court also determined that Wallace received all of the process he was due 
during the disciplinary proceedings.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 
(1974); Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  Wallace does not challenge 
this ruling on appeal, and we see no error in the District Court’s reasoning. 
